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Understanding Earnings, Labor Supply,
and Retirement Decisions
Abstract
We develop and estimate a model in which individuals make decisions on consumption, human 
capital investment, labor supply, and retirement. Unlike all previous work, our model allows
both an endogenous wage process (which is typically assumed exogenous in the human capital
and earnings dynamics literature). In addition, we introduce health shocks. We estimate the
model and match the life-cycle profiles of wages, hours and retirement from SIPP data. We 
analyze the impact of health shocks on retirement, as well as the effect of changes in payroll
taxes and increases in the Normal Retirement Age on labor force participation of older
Americans.
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1 Introduction 
Understanding retirement behavior is fundamental to analyzing the impact that policy 
changes will have on the well-being of old Americans. How important are health shocks 
in triggering retirement? What are the effects of extending the Normal Retirement Age on 
the labor force participation rate of old workers? To what extent would the elimination 
of the payroll tax above the full retirement age induce people to stay in the workforce 
longer? These are important questions and we seek to answer them in a framework in 
which retirement and earnings profle are endogenous. 
The retirement literature typically takes the wage process as given and estimates the 
date of retirement. One typically sees wages fall substantially before retirement. Raw 
wages for individuals who work fall by over 25% between age 55 and 65. In the retire-
ment literature, this trend is extremely important for explaining retirement behavior. If 
workers do not make much, it is economically effcient for them to retire. A policy such 
as extending the retirement age to 70 could have very negative consequences on these 
workers who have low wages at this point in their lives. Lifecycle human capital models 
(Ben-Porath (1967)) provide a very different perspective. They take the retirement date 
as given, but model the formation of the wage process. Young workers optimally choose 
to invest in their human capital which results in wage growth. Wages then level off in 
mid-career. As workers approach retirement, they optimally stop investing and allow 
their skills to depreciate. This leads to a fall in wages right before retirement. One can 
see that these models have very different predictions about changes in the retirement age. 
In the frst type of model, workers will see substantial declines in their wages and we 
may be forcing workers to work at very low wages. By contrast, in the human capital 
model investment will adjust. If the retirement age is extended to 70, workers will invest 
in human capital until a later age. Thus, rather than see wages start to fall at age 55, this 
would likely be delayed until the early sixties. Endogenizing the wage process could lead 
to very different welfare effects when extending the retirement age. 
Quite surprisingly, aside from the seminal work in Heckman (1976, 1975), there has 
been little effort integrating these two important paradigms. This paper attempts to fll 
this void by estimating a life-cycle model wherein the wage, labor supply and retirement 
choices are rationalized in one unifed setting. After endogenizing both labor supply and 
human capital, this model is rich enough to explain the life-cycle patterns of both wages 
and labor supply, with a focus on wage patterns and retirement at the end of working life. 
Specifcally, we develop and estimate a Ben-Porath type human capital model in which 
workers undertake consumption, human capital investment, and labor supply decisions. 
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We estimate the model using Indirect Inference, matching the wage and hours profles of 
male high school graduates from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). 
With a parsimonious life-cycle model in which none of the parameters explicitly depend 
upon age or experience, we are able to replicate the main features of the data. In partic-
ular we match the large increase in wages and very small increase in labor supply at the 
beginning of the life-cycle as well as the small decrease in wages but very large decrease 
in labor supply at the end of the life-cycle. 
While our baseline model does not incorporate health, we estimate a specifcation that 
allows the taste for leisure to depend on health and for this effect to increase with age. 
Surprisingly, such an “enhanced” model does not signifcantly improve the ft of the life-
cycle patterns of wage and labor supply of the SIPP data. We also show that even within 
this model that allows a direct and fexible effect of health on labor supply, health plays a 
relatively minor role in the decline in labor supply late in life. 
We use the estimated model to simulate the impacts of various Social Security policy 
changes. Much serious work has been developed to quantitatively estimate the economic 
consequences of an aging population and evaluate the remedy policies (Gustman and 
Steinmeier, 1986; Rust and Phelan, 1997; French, 2005; French and Jones, 2011; Haan and 
Prowse, 2014). They model retirement as a result of combinations of declining wages, 
increasing actuarial unfairness of the Social Security and pension system, and increas-
ing tastes for leisure. However, there is a major difference between our model and the 
previous retirement literature. Prior work typically takes the wage process as given and 
focuses on the retirement decision itself. For example, when conducting the counterfac-
tual experiment of reducing the Social Security beneft by 20%, the previous literature 
takes the same age-wage profle as in the baseline model and re-estimates the retirement 
behavior under the new environment. As the wage has already been declining signif-
cantly and exogenously approaching the retirement age, under the new policy working 
is still less likely attractive for many workers. However, as we show in our model, less 
generous Social Security benefts result in higher labor supply later in the life-cycle, so 
workers adjust their investment over the life-cycle, which results in a higher human cap-
ital level as well as higher labor supply earlier. On average the observed wage levels are 
5% higher between 65 and 80. Over the whole life-cycle, observed average yearly wages, 
total labor income, and total labor force participation rates increase by 1.5%, 2.17%, and 
1.57%, respectively. By contrast, in the model with exogenous human capital, the percent-
age increases in yearly wages, total labor income and total labor supply are less signif-
cant, by 0.2%, 1.26%, and 1.31%, respectively. The differences are more dramatic in the 
experiments in which we remove the Social Security system, with the exogenous model 
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underestimating most effects. 
2 Relevant Literature 
Human capital models have been widely accepted as a mechanism to explain life-
cycle wage growth as well as the labor supply and income patterns. In his seminal paper, 
Ben-Porath (1967) develops the human capital model with the idea that individuals in-
vest in their human capital “up front.” In what follows we often use the term—“human 
capital model” to mean “Ben-Porath model.” Heckman (1975, 1976) further extends the 
model and present more general human capital models in which each individual makes 
decisions on labor supply, investment and consumption. In both papers, each individual 
lives for fnite periods and the retirement age is fxed. In their recent paper, Manuelli et al. 
(2012) calibrate a Ben-Porath model to include the endogenous retirement decision. All 
three models are deterministic. 
Relative to the success in theory, there hasn’t been as much work empirically estimat-
ing the Ben-Porath model. Mincer (1958) derives an approximation of the Ben-Porath 
model and greatly simplifes the estimation with a quadratic in experience, which is used 
in numerous empirical papers estimating the wage process (Heckman et al. (2006)). Early 
work on explicit estimation of the Ben-Porath model was done by Heckman (1975, 1976), 
Haley (1976), and Rosen (1976). Heckman et al. (1998a) is a more recent attempt to es-
timate the Ben-Porath model. They utilize the implication of the standard Ben-Porath 
model where at old ages the investment is almost zero. However, this implication does 
not hold any more when the retirement is uncertain, where each individual always has 
an incentive to invest a positive amount in human capital. Browning et al. (1999) survey 
much of this literature.1 
Another type of human capital model, the learning-by-doing model, draws relatively 
more attention in empirical work. In the learning-by-doing model human capital accu-
mulates exogenously, but only when an individual works. Thus workers can only impact 
their human capital accumulation through the work decision. In these models, the total 
cost of leisure is not only the direct lost earnings at the current time, but also includes 
the additional lost future earnings from the lower level of human capital. Shaw (1989) 
is among the frst to empirically estimate the learning-by-doing model, using the PSID 
model and utilizing the Euler equations on consumption and labor supply with translog 
utility. Keane and Wolpin (1997) and Imai and Keane (2004) are two classic examples of re-
1Other more recent work includes Taber (2002), who incorporates progressive income taxes into the 
estimation, and Kuruscu (2006), who estimates the model nonparametrically. 
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search that directly estimate a dynamic life-cycle model with learning-by-doing. Blundell 
et al. (2015) is a more recent example. These papers assume an exogenously fxed retire-
ment age. Wallenius (2009) points out that such a learning-by-doing model does not ft the 
pattern of wages and hours well at old ages.2 Heckman et al. (2003) study the potential 
effects of wage subsidies on skill formulation by comparing on-the-job training models 
with learning-by-doing models. They simulate the effects of the 1994 EITC schedule for 
families with two children and fnd evidence that EITC lowers the long-term wages of 
people with low levels of education. They fnd that the learning-by-doing model pre-
dictions of the EITC policy effects ft the actual changes better than the Ben-Porath style 
model. 
There is a large and growing literature on many aspects of retirement. In these models, 
typically retirement is induced either by increasing utility toward leisure (e.g. Gustman 
and Steinmeier, 1986) or increasing disutility toward labor supply (e.g. Blau, 2008). Haan 
and Prowse (2014) estimate the extent to which the increase in life expectancy affects 
retirement. Blau (2008) evaluates the role of uncertain retirement ages in the retirement-
consumption puzzle. 
Retirement can also be induced by declining wages at old ages and/or fxed costs 
of working. Rust and Phelan (1997) estimate a dynamic life-cycle labor supply model 
with endogenous retirement decisions to study the effect of Social Security and Medicare 
in retirement behavior. French (2005) estimates a more comprehensive model including 
savings to study the effect of Social Security and pension as well as health in retirement 
decisions. French and Jones (2011) evaluate the role of health insurance in shaping re-
tirement behavior. Casanova (2010) studies the joint retirement decision among married 
couples. Prescott et al. (2009) and Rogerson and Wallenius (2010) present models where 
retirement could be induced by a convex effective labor function or fxed costs. 
In all the retirement literature listed above—theoretical or empirical—the wage pro-
cess is assumed to be exogenous. That is, even when the environment changes while 
conducting counterfactual experiments, for example changing the Social Security poli-
cies, the wage process is kept the same and only the response in the retirement decision 
is studied. 
2However, if one interprets the hourly wages as labor income and hours as labor force participation rates 
(since there is no participation decision in their model), the ft in Imai and Keane (2004) would be improved 
at older ages. 
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3 Model 
We present and estimate a Ben-Porath style human capital model with endogenous 
labor supply and retirement in which individuals choose consumption, human capital 
investment, and labor supply (including retirement as a special case). For simplicity we 
suppress the individual subscript i for all variables. We allow for heterogeneity in some 
of the parameters when estimating the model. We delay discussion of this to Section 4.2 
for expositional convenience. 
3.1 Set-up 
Time is discrete. Each individual lives from period t = 0 to t = T. At the beginning of 
the initial period, each individual is endowed with an initial asset A0 ∈ R and an initial 
human capital level H0 ∈ R+ . 
We model the extensive margin of labor supply, so at each period the individual de-
cides either to work or not. The fow utility at period t is 
1−ηcctut (ct, ` t, γt) = + γt ̀  t (1)1− ηc 
where ct is consumption and ` t ∈ {0, 1} is leisure. The coeffcient γt represents taste for 
leisure. We allow for shocks in γt which is assumed to be an i.i.d. random variable for 
each individual.3 
If an individual chooses to work, he decides on how much time, It, to invest in human 
capital and spends the rest, 1 − It, at effective (or productive) work from which the wage 
income is earned. Human capital is produced according to the production function 
= (1− δ) Ht + ξtπ IαI HαH (2)Ht+1 t t 
where Ht is the human capital level at period t. The ξt is an idiosyncratic shock to the 
human capital innovation. If an individual chooses not to work, he does not invest in 
human capital (so It = 0) and human capital depreciates at rate δ. 
The labor market is perfectly competitive. We normalize the rent of human capital to 
one so that the wage for the effective labor supply equals the human capital Ht. Thus 
pre-tax labor income at any point in time is Ht (1− ̀  t) (1− It). 
3A key part of our exercise is that we do not allow γt to vary systematically across age. We describe 
the exact process in the next subsection. The two terms—“period” and “age”—are used interchangeably 
throughout the paper. 
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While we have tried to keep the basic model as simple as possible, the social security 
system in the U.S. is such a crucial part of the retirement decision that we incorporate it 
into the model. We model the social security enrollment decision as a one time decision. 
Once a person turns 62 they can start claiming social security and once they have started 
claiming, they continue to collect benefts until their death. We will let ssat denote a 
binary decision variable indicating whether a person starts claiming at period t and let 
sst be a state variable indicating whether a person began claiming prior to period t. Since 
claiming is irreversible, once sst = 1 then ssat is no longer a relevant choice variable. Thus 
the law of motion can be written as 
ss0 =0 
sst = max {sst−1, ssat−1} . (3) 
The claiming decision (ssat) is made separately from the labor force participation decision 
(` t) so that one can receive the social security beneft while working (subject to applicable 
rules such as the earnings test). 
Once they have begun claiming, an individual collects benefts ssbt which are a func-
tion of the claiming age and the Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIMEt). In practice 
we approximate the AIME and use the social security rules as of 2004. Details are in the 
Appendix. This is incorporated into the budget constraint 
At+1 = (1 + r)At + Yt (Ht (1− ̀  t) (1− It) , ssbt) − ct + τt, (4) 
where At stands for asset and r is the risk free interest rate. Yt(·, ·) is the after-tax income 
which is a function of wage income, the social security beneft ssbt, and the tax code. 
Government transfers, τt, provide a consumption foor c as in Hubbard et al. (1995) so 
τt = max {0, c− ((1 + r)At + Yt − At+1)} , (5) 
where At+1 is the asset lower bound at period t + 1.4 
Life ends at the end of period T and each individual values the bequest he will leave. 
It takes the form 
(b2 + AT+1)
1−ηc 
b(AT+1) = b1 (6)1− ηc 
4We defne the asset lower bound as the amount that each individual can pay back for sure before 
death, as in Aiyagari (1994). Since the probability of not working at each period is positive, the lower 
bound is characterized by the nonnegative consumption and the bequest function specifed below, which 
T−t+1is At = −b2/ (1 + r) . 
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where b1 captures the relative weight of the bequest motive and b2 determines its curva-
ture as in DeNardi (2004). 
3.2 Solving the model 
Two shocks affect individuals: the leisure shock, γt, and the human capital innovation 
shock, ξt. The timing of the model works as follows: at the beginning of each period 
γt is realized by the agent. He then simultaneously chooses consumption, labor supply, 
human capital investment, and social security application when relevant. After these 
decisions are made, the human capital innovation shock ξt is realized, which determines 
the human capital level in the following period. Both γt and ξt are i.i.d. shocks from the 
perspective of the agents—so agents have no private information about their value prior 
to their realizations. 
The recursive value function can be written as 
Vt (Xt, γt) = max {ut (ct, ` t, γt) + βE [Vt+1 (Xt+1, γt+1)| Xt, ct, ` t, It, ssat]} (7) 
ct,` t,It,ssat 
where Xt = {At, Ht, AIMEt, sst} is the vector of state variables. The expectation is over 
the leisure shock in γt+1 and the human capital innovation ξt. 
The solution to the agent’s problem each period is done in two stages. We frst solve 
for the optimal choices conditional on the labor supply decision and then we determine 
the labor supply decision. 
The optimal consumption Ct,0 (Xt), investment It,0 (Xt), and social security claiming 
SSAt,0(Xt) decisions conditional on participating in the labor market (` t = 0) depend 
only on Xt and can be obtained from ( )1−ηcct{Ct,0 (Xt) , It,0 (Xt) ,SSAt,0(Xt)} ≡ argmax + βE [ Vt+1 (Xt+1, γt+1)| Xt, ct, ` t = 0, It, ssat] (8)1− ηcct ,It ,ssat 
and the conditional value function is 
(Ct,0 (Xt))1−ηc eVt,0 (Xt) ≡ + βE [ Vt+1 (Xt+1, γt+1)| Xt, Ct,0 (Xt) , ` t = 0, It,0 (Xt) ,SSAt,0(Xt)] (9)1− ηc 
Similarly, conditional on not working (` t = 1), we can calculate the optimal consump-
tion and claiming decision from ( )1−ηcct{Ct,1 (Xt) ,SSAt,1(Xt)} ≡ argmax + βE [ Vt+1 (Xt+1, γt+1)| Xt, ct, ` t = 1, It = 0, ssat] (10) 
ct ,ssat 1− ηc 
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E [ Vt+1 (Xt+1, γt+1)| Xt+1] = Φ (ε ∗ t+1 (Xt+1)) Vet+1,0 (Xt+1) + (1− Φ (ε ∗ t+1 (Xt+1))) · " � # 2 aε − ε ∗ a Φ t+1 (Xt+1)εeVt+1,1 (Xt+1) + exp a0 + �  2 Φ −ε∗ t+1 (Xt+1) 
E ( γt| γt ≥ γ ∗ t (Xt)) = 
 
exp a0 + 
2aε 
2 
Φ (aε − ε ∗ t (Xt)) 
Φ (−ε∗ t (Xt)) 
and defne the conditional value function apart from γt to be 
(Ct,1 (Xt))1−ηc eVt,1 (Xt) ≡ + βE [ Vt+1 (Xt+1, γt+1)| Xt, Ct,1 (Xt) , ` t = 1, It = 0,SSAt,1(Xt)] . (11)1− ηc 
Notice that since there is no serial correlation in the stochastic shocks of leisure, γt, the 
conditional policy and value functions defned in equations (8)-(11) do not depend on γt. 
The individual works if 
eVt,0 (Xt) ≥Vet,1 (Xt) + γt. 
This means that there exists a threshold value 
γt 
∗ (Xt) = Vet,0 (Xt) − Vet,1 (Xt) (12) 
such that ⎧ ⎨1, if γt ≥ γt ∗ (Xt)` t = . (13)⎩0, if γt < γt ∗ (Xt) 
We use the the parametric form for γt, 
γt = exp (a0 + aεεt) (14) 
where εt follows an independent and identically-distributed standard normal distribu-




. Then we can ε 
calculate the threshold value of εt as5 
1 
ε ∗ t (Xt) ≡ {log (γt ∗ (Xt)) − a0} . (15)aε 
Since γt is log-normal, 
Therefore 
e5Note Vt,0 (Xt) > Vet,1 (Xt) as long as Ht > 0. 
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Finally note that Xt+1 is a known function of Xt, ct, ` t, It, ssat and ξt, so to solve for 
E [Vt+1 (Xt+1, γt+1)| Xt, ct, ` t, It, ssat] = E [ E (Vt+1 (Xt+1, γt+1)| Xt+1)| Xt, ct, ` t, It, ssat] 
we just need to integrate over the distribution of ξt. We assume it is i.i.d and follows a 
log-normal distribution, ⎛   ⎞ 
log σ2 + 1  ξ
log (ξt) ∼ N ⎝− , log σ2 + 1 ⎠ (16)2 ξ 
so that ξt has mean of one and variance of σξ 
2. 
4 Estimation 
The estimation of the model is carried out using a two-step strategy. First, we pre-
set parameters that either can be cleanly identifed without explicitly using our model or 
are not the focus of this paper. In the second step, we estimate the remaining preference 
and production parameters of the model using Indirect Inference. The model is described 
by equations (1)-(7) and we summarize the parameters here. The parameters related to 
preferences are the intertemporal elasticity of consumption, ηc, the discount rate, β, the 
parameters determining the taste for leisure, a0 and aε, and the bequest parameters b1 and 
b2. Human capital production is determined by δ, π, αI , αH and σξ . Parameters related to 
the budget constraint are the interest rate r and the consumption foor c. Finally there are 
initial values for the state variables, assets, A0, human capital, H0, and Averaged Indexed 
Monthly Earnings, AIME0. 
4.1 Pre-set Parameters 
The set of parameters pre-set in the frst stage includes the interest rate, initial wealth 
and initial AIME, the time discount rate, CRRA of utility in consumption, consumption 
foor, and bequest shifter. Specifcally, we do not try to match moments in consumption or 
assets as those are not the focus of this paper. Given the total wealth level, the consump-
tion allocation across periods are jointly determined by β, ηc, A0, c, b1, and b2. Separately 
identifying these parameters require matching moments related to consumption or asset 
accumulation. For this reason we fx β, ηc, A0, c, and b2, and only estimate b1. of some of 
our results to these values. 
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Table 1: Normalized or pre-set parameters 
Parameters Normalized/Pre-set Values 
Interest rate r 0.03 
Discount β 0.97 
Risk Aversion ηc 4.0 
Initial wealtha A0 0.0 
Initial AIMEa AIME0 0.0 
Consumption foorb c 2.19 
Bequest shifterc b2 300.0 
aThe initial age is 18. 
bThe consumption foor is equivalent to $4380 in 2004$, since we normalize the total 
time endowment for labor supply at one period—which is 2000 hours—as one. 
cThe bequest shifter is equivalent to $600, 000. 
One period is defned as one year.6 The initial period in our model corresponds to 
age 18 and ends at age 80.7 The early retirement age is 62 and the normal retirement age 
is 65. The risk free real interest rate is set as r = 0.03 and the time discount rate is set 
as β = 0.97. The coeffcient of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) in the utility from 
consumption is set as ηc = 4.0. The consumption foor is set as c = 2.19, as estimated in 
French and Jones (2011).8 
The parameter which determines the curvature of the bequest function is set as b2 = 
300.9 This number is close to French (2005) where he sets b2 = 250 or French and Jones 
(2011) where they estimate b2 = 222.10 We assume all individuals start off their adult life 
with no wealth and zero level of AIME at age 18. These normalized or pre-set parameters 
are summarized in Table 1. 
4.2 Heterogeneity 
This leaves the following parameters: b1, a0, aε, δ, π, αI , αH, σξ and H0. We allow for 
heterogeneity in three of these: ability to learn (π) , ability to earn (H0), and tastes for 
leisure (a0). For computational reasons we only have nine types determining the joint 
distribution of (a0, π). Specifcally, we model it as a nine-point Gauss-Hermite approxi-
mation of a joint normal distribution, which depends on fve parameters: the mean and 
6Mid-year retirement might be an issue. However, more than half of workers are never observed work-
ing half-time approaching retirement, so it would not be a big issue. 
7The life expectancy for white males is 74.1 in 2000 and 76.5 in 2010. 
8c = 4380/2000 = 2.19 since we normalize the total time endowment for labor supply at one period as 
one. 
9It is equivalent to $600, 000 in 2004 U.S. dollar. 
10They are $500, 000 and $444, 000 in their papers. 
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variance of a0, the mean and variance of π, and the correlation between the two. Respec-
tively we write this as (µa0 , σa0 , µπ, σπ, ρ). We emphasize that since we are only using nine 
points we are not assuming that the Gauss-Hermite is a good approximation of a normal, 
but rather view this as the parametrization itself. That is, we assume that the joint dis-
tribution of (a0, π) is a parametric discrete distribution with 9 points determined by the 
parameter vector (µa0 , σa0 , µπ, σπ, ρ). 
Since human capital is already a state variable in our model, we can be more fexible 
in modeling initial human capital. We allow it to be correlated with (a0, π) through the 
functional form 
H0 = exp (γ0 + γa0 a0 + γππ + σH0ν) (17) 
where ν ∼ N (0, 1) is an i.i.d standard normal random variable. 
4.3 Estimation Procedure 
We apply Indirect Inference to estimate the parameters of interest, Θ, 
according to the following procedure. 
⎧ ⎫ ⎪⎨ ⎪⎬ 
Θ = µa0 , σa0 , aε,⎪| {z }⎩ 
leisure 
δ, αI , αH, σξ , µπ, σπ,| {z }





γ0, γa0 , γπ, σH0| {z } ⎪⎭ 
n initial human capital 
i) Calculate the auxiliary model from the data. 
ii) Iterate on the following procedure for different values of Θ until the minimum dis-
tance has been found. 
(a) Given a set of parameters, solve value functions and policy functions for the 
entire state space grid. 
(b) Generate the life-cycle profle for each simulated individual. 
(c) Calculate the auxiliary model from the simulation. 
(d) Calculate the distance between the simulated auxiliary model and the data aux-
iliary model. 
4.4 Data and the Auxiliary Parameters 
Our primary data set is the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). The 
SIPP is comprised of a number of short panels of respondents and we use all of the panels 
starting with the 1984 panel and ending with the 2008 panel. To focus on as homogeneous 
a group as possible, the sample only includes white male high school graduates. 
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Our measure of labor force participation is a dummy variable for whether the indi-
vidual worked during the survey month.11 Clearly the aggregation is imperfect. We con-
struct the hourly wage as the earnings in the survey month divided by the total number 
of hours worked in the survey month. 
We begin estimation of the model from age 22 rather than 18 for two reasons. First, 
we have a short panel meaning that many 19 year old high school graduates may return 
to college after they leave the panel. Second, our model does not include any search or 
matching behavior, which might be important for the labor force patterns among very re-
cent labor force entrance as they transition from school to work as suggested by literature 
(Topel and Ward, 1992; Neal, 1999). Our model does over-predict the labor supply for 
those individuals. 
Four sets of moment conditions at each age from 22 to 65 are chosen to assemble the 
auxiliary model. We use a total of 230,657 panel observations from 80,519 different re-
spondents. 
i) The labor force participation rates (LFPR); 
ii) The frst moments of the logarithm of observed wages; 
iii) The frst moments of the logarithm of observed wages after controlling for individ-
ual fxed effects.12 
iv) The second moments (standard deviation) of the logarithm of observed wages. 
As is standard in the literature on estimation of Ben-Porath style human capital we as-
sume that wages in the data correspond to 
Wt = Ht (1− It) (18) 
in the model. We match both age-wage profles, with and without controlling for individ-
ual fxed effect as the two have quite different patterns. 
Figures 1a-1c present these four profles. Figure 1a plots the labor force participation 
rates between age 22 and 65. Figure 1b plots two log wage profles. The frst one is the log 
wage profle from the pooled sample, while the second one is the log wage profle after 
11In SIPP an individual is observed in at most three months each year. If an individual is observed 
working more than 50% of the time then he is categorized as participating in the labor force, otherwise not. 
If one is sampled twice for the year and is observed working in one month only, the participation status is 
determined randomly (50% for each possibility). 
12To construct these moments we frst regress log wage on the age dummies and survey year dummies 
and obtain the predicted log wage, denoted as z. We pick a base age (age 30) and calculate the average 
predicted log wage at the base age for each year, denoted as z̄a,j, where a is the base age and j is for survey 
year. We then pick a base year y and calculate the difference of z̄a,j between each year j and the base year y, 
denoted as Δz̄a,j. Finally we calculate the difference between the original log wage and Δz̄a,j and defne the 
result as ln W̃t, which is the log wage after fltering out the time fxed effects. 
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controlling for individual fxed effects. The original log wage profle has a hump shape, 
but the one fltering out individual fxed effects does not decline within the examined 
period which is between age 22 and 65. Figure 1c shows the extent to which the variance 
of log wages increases with age. 
The most interesting result in Figures 1a-1c is the discrepancy between the age-wage 
profles with or without controlling for individual fxed effects. This has been docu-
mented in various data sets, including the National Longitudinal Survey of Older Men 
(NLSOM) data (Johnson and Neumark, 1996), the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 
data (Rupert and Zanella, 2012), and the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) data (Casanova, 
2013). These papers fnd that after controlling for individual fxed effects the age-wage 
profle is fatter than the hump-shaped age-wage profle estimated using pooling obser-
vations, and it does not decline until 60s or late 60s. All of these papers argue that this 
evidence is not consistent with the traditional human capital model since the traditional 
human capital model would predict a hump-shaped wage. The intuition is that when the 
human capital depreciation outweighs the investment, wages start to decline which gen-
erates a hump-shaped profle. Fitting the wage profle after controlling for fxed effects 
makes our problem more challenging because we need to explain the decrease in labor 
supply later in life when there is little evidence that wages decline. 
To further verify this result we compare our SIPP results with the Current Population 
Survey (CPS) data. From the CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (MORG) data, we 
match the same respondent in two consecutive surveys using the method proposed in 
Madrian and Lefgren (2000), and we have a short panel with each individual interviewed 
twice, one year apart.13 We construct a similar short panel from the CPS March Annual 
Social and Economic Supplement fles (March). The difference is that the wage informa-
tion is collected from the reference week in the CPS MORG data and from the previous 
year in the CPS March data. 
Figure 2 presents the age-wage profles with or without controlling for individual 
fxed effects for male high school graduates from the 1979-2012 CPS MORG data and the 
1979-2007 CPS March data. We fnd a somewhat even larger discrepancy in the age-wage 
profles as in the SIPP data presented in Figure 1b.14 
13For MORG data, they are the fourth and eighth interview. 
14Time fxed effects are fltered out, as described in footnote 12. We use the same starting year for the 
CPS MORG data and the CPS March data. Using the 1979-2007 CPS MORG data generates essentially same 
profles. 
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Table 2: Estimates in the baseline modela 
Parameters Estimates Standard Errors 
Leisure: Standard Deviation of Shock aε 0.433 (0.012) 
Human Capital Depreciation δ 0.101 (0.007) 
Human Capital Production Function: I factor αI 0.076 (0.019) 
Human Capital Production Function: H factor αH 0.151 (0.021) 
Standard Deviation of Human Capital Innovation σξ 0.405 (0.082) 
Bequest Weight b1 424, 070 (90, 735) 
Parameter heterogeneityb 
Leisure: Mean of Intercept µa0 −6.525 (0.050) 
Leisure: Standard Deviation of Intercept σa0 0.874 (0.053) 
Human Capital Productivity, Mean µπ 1.758 (0.069) 
Human Capital Productivity, Standard Deviation σπ 0.583 (0.026) 
Correlation between a0and π ρ −0.893 (0.064) 
Initial Human Capital Level at Age 18 
Intercept γ0 1.625 (0.099) 
Coeffcient on a0 γa0 0.052 (0.007) 
Coeffcient on π γπ 0.531 (0.060) 
Standard Deviation of Error Term σH0 0.239 (0.036) 
χ2 Statistic = 212c Degrees of freedom = 161 
aIndirect Inference estimates. Estimates use a diagonal weighting matrix. Standard er-
rors are given in parentheses. 
bThe joint distribution of (a0, π) is a parametric discrete distribution with nine points de-
termined by these fve parameters, using a nine-point Gauss-Hermite approximation. 
cThis is the J-statistic. The critical values of the χ2 distribution are χ2 = 206,(161,0.01) 
χ2 = 212, χ2 = 222.(161,0.005) (161,0.001) 
5 Estimation Results 
The estimates of the parameters are listed in Table 2. Of particular importance are the 
depreciation rate, δ, curvature in the human capital production function, αI , and aε which 
determines the elasticity of labor supply. Before discussing these parameter values we 
examine the ft of the model in Figures 3a-3d.15 
The frst and central point is that our parsimonious model can reconcile the main facts 
in the data: a small increase in labor supply/large increase in wages at the beginning of 
the life-cycle along with the large decrease in labor supply/small decrease in wages at the 
15The overidentifcation test statistic is reported in the bottom of Table 2. The model is rejected at the 1% 
level but not at the 0.5% level. The fact that we reject is not surprising given the simplicity of our model 
and the size of our sample. One could easily add some extra parameters to pass the statistical criterion, but 
this is not our goal. Our goal is to use a simple model that does a very good job of capturing the life-cycle 
patterns. 
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end of the life-cycle.16 
The simulated labor force participation rate increases slightly between age 22 and 30 
as shown in Figure 3a. 
Our main result is that this simple model is able to generate a massive decline in labor 
supply between age 55 and 65, which fts the sharp decline of labor force participation 
rates within that age period in the data and simultaneously the fat wage profle in the 
fxed effect model. 
Our model generates similar discrepancy between the log wages with and without 
controlling for individual fxed effects, as shown in Figures 3b and 3c, and both profles ft 
the data well. Log wages after fltering out individual fxed effects increase at a decreasing 
pace from age 22 to age 55 and then decreases slightly (Figure 3b). On the other hand, 
Figure 3c shows that the original log wage profle presents a hump shape which almost 
replicates the data profle. 
The model also replicates the log wage variation as in the data (Figure 3d). This in-
creasing variation mainly comes from the heterogeneity in the parameters. Without het-
erogeneity in parameters, the wage variation would decrease with age as human capital 
would converge due to concavity of the production function. With heterogeneity, the 
human capital level might diverge, depending on parameter values. 
We obtain our ft of the life-cycle profles of labor supply and log wages despite the 
lack of any explicit time-dependent preference, production or constraints in our model. 
Two key features of our model make them possible: the human capital depreciation and 
the separation between the effective labor and observed labor. We discuss each of these 
in turn. 
We argued above that human capital depreciation is essential for matching the labor 
force participation profle. This discussion implies that our estimate of a depreciation 
value δ = 0.101 plays a major role explaining the pattern of wages and life cycle la-
bor supply. Given this, it is important to place this value into the range of estimates in 
the literature. This is not easily done as there is a very large range of estimates—some 
larger than our 10.1% estimate and some smaller. There are broadly three different liter-
atures that estimate related parameters. The frst of these is motivated by family leave 
for women and tries to estimate the effect of career interruption on wages. It fnds esti-
mates ranging from 1.5% per year to 25%.17 A second literature looks at displacement 
16One should keep in mind that our parsimonious specifcation might be a limitation on our policy coun-
terfactuals as other features that we have not explicitly modeled might impact those simulations. 
17A classic early paper on this topic is Mincer and Polachek (1974) which estimates a net depreciation rate 
of around 1.5 percent per year. Mincer and Ofek (1982) go beyond this to discuss the difference between 
short term and long term losses from interruption. In the long run individuals invest in human capital to 
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from the Displaced Worker Survey and also fnds a wide range of estimates—many of 
which are not directly comparable to ours.18 A third literature examines the effect of the 
length of an unemployment spell on the wage at rehire. Schmieder et al. (2014) is a recent 
and convincingly identifed paper of this type. They estimate the effect using a regression 
discontinuity with German data. In Germany the length of eligibility for unemployment 
insurance depends on age with jumps at ages 42 and at 44. They see an increase in un-
employment duration at these two discontinuity points, so they use the kink points as 
instruments in order to estimate the effect of the length of unemployment duration on re-
employment wages. They fnd that one extra month of unemployment leads to a decrease 
in wages of 0.8% which gives an annual rate remarkably close to our estimate of 10.1%. 
While it looks at women in England, Blundell et al. (2015) is of similar style to our paper 
in the sense that it is a structural life-cycle model of labor supply and human capital for-
mation. Interestingly, their analysis reveals a substantial depreciation of human capital 
ranging from 6% to 11%. 
A second important feature for explaining the life-cycle profles comes from a point 
emphasized by Heckman et al. (1998a): observed wages are different than observed hu-
man capital. We see in fgure 3b that in both the model and the data, once fxed effects are 
accounted for, wages are close to fat for ages 50-65 despite the fact that there is a large 
decrease in labor supply. This distinction between human capital and wages can help 
explain this effect. As shown in Figure 4a, at older ages (around 60) the actual human 
capital level has already depreciated to a relatively low level, even though the observed 
wage level is still quite high. This is due to the quick decline in investment that happens 
around that time. This means that measured wages, Ht (1− It), can be fat while Ht is 
decreasing as long as It is decreasing as well. The time investment profle in Figure 4b 
offset the initial loss, so Mincer and Ofek (1982)’s defnition of short term losses is more closely related to our 
concept of depreciation. Using panel data methods for the National Longitudinal Survey of Mature Women 
they fnd estimates ranging from 5.6% to 8.9%. Light and Ureta (1995) use National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth 1979 data and estimate that the immediate effect of a year of non-participation in the labor market 
leads to a decline in earnings of 25%. Kunze (2002) and Gorlich and de Grip (2009) both use German data 
(IAB employment sample and German Socio-economic panel respectively). Kunze (2002) fnds estimates 
of about 2-5% wages losses for women from unemployment spells but about 13-18% from parental leave. 
Gorlich and de Grip (2009) fnd a variety of results ranging from around 1.5% to 5% depending on the type 
of spell. 
18While much of this literature is more focused on earnings than wages, some papers look at weekly 
earnings. Both Farber (1993) and Ruhm (1991) estimate the effect of a displacement on re-employment 
wages and obtain a range of estimates with most being around declines of 10% but varying from 6.5% to 
16.9%. These numbers are not annualized but are just from the incidence of displacement. Li (2013) uses 
the same data but produces annualized versions so that the effects can be more easily compared to our 
estimate of δ. She estimates the effects for many different occupations with a huge range of estimates across 
occupations. Focusing on the three largest occupations she fnds a deprecation of 9.4% for Installation and 
Repair workers, 7.7% for Production workers, and 17.4% for workers in Transportation. 
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matches this implication. The solid line is the unconditional investment profle while the 
dashed line is the average investment profle conditional on working. These two profles 
are very close to each other at prime ages, and both decrease over time. 
The relatively high value of investment late in the working career is also related to why 
we fnd a much smaller level of the human capital curvature parameter, αI , compared to 
the literature summarized in Browning et al. (1999). The larger is αI the steeper is the 
decline in human capital investment with age. At the extreme when αI = 1 one gets a 
“bang-bang” solution with full investment to a point and then zero investment thereafter. 
Because depreciation is large, in order to ft the relatively fat wage profle that we see at 
older ages one needs a lot of investment at this age which requires a small value of αI . 
Heckman et al. (1998a) ft the wage data with a much larger value of αI but our models 
are quite different in a number of ways including the fact that this model includes leisure 
and in their model they set deprecation to zero. 
At the early stage of the life-cycle, workers invest a considerable amount of time in 
human capital production which drives up both the human capital level and the wage. 
Once the worker reaches his mid-career (around age 45), he reduces the time investment 
at an increasing rate and human capital starts to decrease. As the worker spends less of 
his working time investing, wages continue to increase. One can see in Figure 4a that the 
observed wage keeps increasing after age 45 and peaks around 52, after which the ob-
served wage starts declining slowly. After age 62, however, since the worker has already 
allocated most of his time in effective working, there is no further room for such adjust-
ment. As a result, the observed wage declines at almost the same rate at which human 
capital depreciates. This leads to large falls in labor supply at older ages. 
Such separation also helps generate the pattern that the working hours profle peaks 
earlier than the wage profle (Weiss, 1986). Working hours increase slightly with age 
when the worker is young, with a large portion devoted to human capital investment. 
The working hours profle peaks around age 40 and starts declining. However, with 
proportionally less time devoted to human capital investment and more time to effective 
labor supply (Figure 4b), the observed wage increases from labor market entry to about 
age 52. 
5.1 The Role of Health 
We have intentionally kept our model simple to show that human capital can ex-
plain the dramatic fall in labor supply at the end of the life-cycle. However, there are 
many alternative reasons why labor supply might decline. Aside from Social Security 
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rules, which we have already incorporated, the most important is health (e.g. Currie and 
Madrian 1999, French and Jones 2011). If the primary reason for retirement is health, its 
omission might seriously distort our results. In this subsection we incorporate health into 
our model in a very fexible way. We show that while it is an important factor, it is not the 
primary driver of retirement. 
We allow for an additional state variable—health status, St ∈ {0, 1}, with 0 being in 
good health and 1 in bad health. Each individual is assumed to have good health at the 
beginning of the frst period, S0 = 0. The health status evolves exogenously according to 
a time-dependent probability transition matrix, and is realized at the beginning of each 
period before any choice is made.19 
We allow the taste for leisure in the utility function (1) to depend on the health status 
and change with age, 
γt = exp (a0 + St (as0 + astt) + aεεt) . (19) 
That is, individuals with bad health have a different taste for leisure than those with good 
health and this difference changes as they age.20 We refer to this model as the baseline 
health model. 
To estimate these two new parameters, as0 and ast, we include the difference in labor 
force participation rates between workers with good health and workers with bad health, 
from age 30 to 65 into our moment conditions. The data moments are derived from the 
1963-2007 CPS March data. 
We then re-estimate the whole model. The ft of the model is presented in Figure 5a. 
Including health (and the additional moments shown in panel (ii) of Figure 5a) into the 
model does not improve its performance on the original moments in any signifcant way. 
However, just because the ft does not improve much does not imply that health does 
not play an important role. It may just be that either health or human capital could ex-
plain retirement.21 To explore the implications of health we use the model estimated 
with health, but then simulate a counterfactual in which there was no health change. 
Specifcally, we eliminate the importance of health for individuals over 50 in two different 
ways—we do not allow their health to worsen and we eliminate the interaction between 
health and preferences for work. Specifcally, we simulate an experiment in which the 
19The health transition matrix is estimated from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data. 
20A key aspect of the thought experiment behind this paper is to not allow preferences to vary systemat-
ically with age in our baseline model. In practice we can only ft the interaction of health and labor supply 
in the data by allowing for an interaction between health and tastes for leisure. The main point of this 
subsection is that health is not essential to explain the profles, so even though we are favoring the model 
with health by allowing this extra fexibility, health has a relatively minor role. 
21Note that this is not to say they are not separately identifed. The extra moments we use for the health 
model identify the importance of health. 
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health status that an individual had at age 50 remains for the rest of their life. Secondly, 
in addition to fxing the health status at age 50, for individuals with bad health status on 
and after age 50, we assume their taste for leisure does not increase with age. That is, 
letting t∗ be the time period in which the individual turns 50, we assume that the taste for 
leisure is now 
γt = exp (a0 + St (as0 + ast · min {t, t ∗}) + aεεt) (20) 
and St = S50 for t > t ∗ . We then re-solve the modifed model and simulate the life-cycle 
profle for each individual using the same estimates from the aforementioned baseline 
health model.22 The profles of labor supply and human capital from the second experi-
ment are plotted in Figure 5b. The difference between the counterfactual and the baseline 
health model is very small in both the labor force participation rate and the human capital 
level. This implies that at least in our model health is not a major factor driving retire-
ment. This result confrms fndings in the previous literature. French (2005) estimates that 
the changes in health attribute to roughly 10% of the drop in the labor force participation 
rates between ages 55 and 70, and the contribution to hours worked by workers near re-
tirement is much smaller. Blau and Shvydko (2011) also report that health deterioration 
is an important but not major cause of retirement. 
6 Changes in Tax and Social Security 
The preceding sections show that the model fts the life-cycle profles of labor supply 
and log wages in the data well. In this section, we use the model to predict how changes 
in the taxes or Social Security rules would affect behavior in labor supply, human capital 
investment and the resulting log wage profle. We conduct seven counterfactual policy 
experiments which refect various changes in the tax codes and Social Security rules. The 
results of these experiments are summarized in columns 2-8 of Panel A in Table 3, where 
the frst column is the baseline model. All numbers are summations throughout the life-
cycle (from age 18 to 80). 
6.1 The Baseline Model 
The frst experiment increases the income tax proportionally by 50%. Column 2 shows 
that after the tax increase, an average individual works additional 1.25 years over the life-
22We are assuming that agents have rational expectations and are aware that their health status will not 
change. We have also simulated models in which they are not aware that their health status will remain 
fxed—it does not change the basic message. 
19 
20 
Table 3: Effects of changing taxes or Social Security rules
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Baseline Tax Increase 50% No Earnings Test NRA = 67 Reduce SSB 20% No SS Taxes No SS Beneft No SS System 
  c Levela ΔLevelb %Δ ΔLevel %Δ ΔLevel %Δ ΔLevel %Δ ΔLevel %Δ ΔLevel %Δ ΔLevel %Δ 
Panel A: Baseline Model 
LFPR 40.356 1.249 3.096 0.387 0.959 0.409 1.012 0.633 1.570 -1.947 -4.826 5.220 12.934 2.647 6.560 
Effective Labor 37.997 1.187 3.125 0.364 0.957 0.382 1.006 0.594 1.563 -1.820 -4.790 4.911 12.926 2.502 6.585 
Pre-tax Income 637.759 28.831 4.521 5.842 0.916 8.484 1.330 13.805 2.165 -45.555 -7.143 97.452 15.280 37.153 5.826 
Average lnw 2.613 0.012 0.468 0.008 0.322 0.007 0.268 0.015 0.569 -0.020 -0.777 0.050 1.903 0.021 0.792 
Human Capital 917.382 25.901 2.823 6.465 0.705 7.665 0.836 12.160 1.326 -39.947 -4.354 82.071 8.946 33.769 3.681 
Investment 2.359 0.062 2.631 0.023 0.988 0.026 1.122 0.040 1.684 -0.127 -5.395 0.308 13.059 0.145 6.147 
Panel B: Exogenous Model 
LFPR 40.412 1.524 3.771 0.084 0.208 0.338 0.835 0.530 1.311 -2.213 -5.475 3.456 8.552 0.907 2.245 
Effective Labor 40.412 1.524 3.771 0.084 0.208 0.338 0.835 0.530 1.311 -2.213 -5.475 3.456 8.552 0.907 2.245 
Pre-tax Income 655.258 25.849 3.945 1.794 0.274 5.235 0.799 8.285 1.264 -33.535 -5.118 50.490 7.705 13.300 2.030 
Average lnw 2.625 0.006 0.248 0.000 0.015 0.001 0.024 0.002 0.076 -0.003 -0.103 0.000 -0.009 -0.002 -0.069 
Panel C: Learning-by-doing Model 
LFPR 40.232 1.287 3.198 0.257 0.638 0.821 2.040 1.186 2.948 -3.474 -8.635 6.368 15.827 3.482 8.655 
Effective Labor 40.232 1.287 3.198 0.257 0.638 0.821 2.040 1.186 2.948 -3.474 -8.635 6.368 15.827 3.482 8.655 
Labor Income 629.286 28.301 4.497 3.825 0.608 13.293 2.112 19.829 3.151 -60.550 -9.622 112.483 17.875 49.189 7.817 
Average lnw 2.572 0.028 1.075 0.014 0.551 0.016 0.620 0.026 1.013 -0.181 -7.026 0.093 3.602 0.064 2.489 
Human Capital 844.058 23.218 2.751 4.107 0.487 12.131 1.437 16.924 2.005 -48.275 -5.719 84.723 10.038 41.654 4.935 
Panel D: Model with Health 
LFPR 41.926 1.065 2.541 0.191 0.456 0.379 0.904 0.607 1.448 -1.727 -4.118 4.275 10.198 2.162 5.156 
Effective Labor 39.625 1.026 2.589 0.180 0.454 0.355 0.897 0.571 1.440 -1.621 -4.090 4.046 10.212 2.060 5.199 
Pre-tax Income 653.149 25.507 3.905 3.179 0.487 7.924 1.213 12.872 1.971 -41.183 -6.305 81.956 12.548 30.333 4.644 
Average lnw 2.603 0.014 0.531 0.004 0.143 0.006 0.215 0.009 0.348 -0.023 -0.867 0.034 1.296 0.006 0.213 
Human Capital 914.487 22.221 2.430 3.606 0.394 7.127 0.779 11.218 1.227 -34.736 -3.798 67.618 7.394 27.030 2.956 
Investment 2.301 0.039 1.715 0.011 0.487 0.024 1.031 0.036 1.581 -0.106 -4.599 0.229 9.958 0.101 4.408 
a The "Level" column refers to the total value aggregated over the whole life-cycle, except the "Average lnw" which is the average yearly log wages. For ex-
ample, in the baseline model, the total LFPR is 40.356 years from 18 to 80.
b The "ΔLevel" column refers to the difference of the total value between the current experiment and the baseline model. For example, in the "No Earnings
Test" case, the LFPR is 0.387 years higher than that in the baseline model across the whole life-cycle from 18 to 80.
c The "%Δ" column refers to the percentage of the difference in the "ΔLevel" column relative to the level in the baseline model. For example, in the "No Earn-
ings Test" case, the LFPR increases by 0.387 years which is equivalent to 0.959% of the LFPR in the baseline model. 
cycle, equivalent to 3.1% of the total labor supply. Most of the increase in the labor supply 
is allocated to the effective labor, which increases by 1.19 years. The investment also 
increases by 0.06 years or 2.6%, which leads to 2.8% increase in the human capital level 
and 0.47% increase in the observed log wages.23 A tax hike has both substitution and 
income effects. The substitution effect discourages labor supply while the income effect 
encourages labor supply. Our frst experiment indicates that in our model the income 
effect dominates the substitution effect and this is the case with most of our experiments.24 
We also see that human capital investment increases in this experiment. The direct effect 
of taxes discourages human capital investment, but the increase in labor supply (and in 
particular delayed retirement) increases human capital investment. 
The manner in which Social Security rules affect labor supply and wages is of central 
interest to policy makers. The six experiments in columns 3-8 are devoted to answering 
these questions. In the frst three we manipulate the current Social Security rules (columns 
3-5) while in the last three we decompose the distortionary effects of the current Social 
Security system (columns 6-8). 
First we remove the Social Security earnings test, which is effective between age 62 and 
70 in the baseline model. In the second one, we delay Normal Retirement Age (NRA) by 
two years: the new NRA is age 67 in this counterfactual experiment while it is age 65 in the 
baseline model25. In the third one, we reduce the Social Security beneft proportionally 
by 20%. The results are presented in columns 3-5 in Table 3. Removing the Social Security 
earnings test between ages 62 and 70 has a smaller effect on all variables; delaying the 
normal retirement age by two years, has a slightly larger impact; reducing the generosity 
of the social security beneft has the largest effect among these three.26 For instance, they 
increase the labor force participation by four-and-a-half, fve, or seven-and-a-half months, 
respectively. One important feature is that the change in the labor supply does not only 
happen later in the life-cycle when the policy change is directly effective, it takes place 
over the whole life-cycle, as indicated in Figure 6a. When the NRA is delayed two years or 
the Social Security beneft is reduced, workers also invest more and therefore have higher 
23Other papers have looked at the effects of taxes and human capital with this type of model. Examples 
are Heckman et al. (1998b), Heckman et al. (1999), and Taber (2002). These experiments are quite different 
as labor supply makes a large difference here so the results are not directly comparable. 
24We also experimented by simulating with a lower coeffcient of risk aversion of ηc = 2 rather than 4. In 
this case the income effect still is larger than the substitution effect, but it is closer. For example in the 50% 
tax increase labor supply increases by 0.7% rather than 3.1%. 
25Technically speaking, the NRA depends on the birth year. But this does not affect our results since for 
the majority of retirees in our data, the NRA is 65. 
26The beneft withdrawn by the earnings test is paid back later in the form of Delayed Retirement Credit 
(DRC). Therefore the net effect of Social Security earnings test is not clear and depends on the life expectancy 
which affects the actuarial fairness. 
21 
human capital levels, which leads to higher wages at old ages (Figure 6a). The wage 
difference is negligible before age 60 but increases substantially after that, reaching 3% or 
5% around age 67. Ignoring such a wage response in experiments involving retirement 
policy will most likely introduce bias. 
In the last three experiments, we decompose the effect of the current U.S. Social Secu-
rity system into the individual effects of the Social Security taxes and the Social Security 
beneft. In Column 6 we keep the Social Security beneft but eliminate the Social Security 
taxes (the payroll taxes);27 in Column 7 we remove the Social Security beneft completely 
but keep the Social Security taxes; in Column 8 we remove the entire Social Security sys-
tem, that is, both the Social Security taxes and the beneft. Removing the Social Security 
taxes induces an average individual to supply 1.95 years less labor. This is not surpris-
ing because removing the Social Security taxes is essentially a universal cut in the tax 
rate. In our tax hike counterfactual, the income effect dominates the substitution effect 
as is true for the cut in social security taxes as well. Analogously, removing the Social 
Security beneft induces more labor supply. However, the increase in the labor supply 
is 5.22 years, which is much higher than 1.95 years reduction of labor supply in the case 
of removing Social Security Taxes. The combination of these two effects leads to the re-
sults in the last experiment where both the Social Security taxes and beneft are removed. 
Column 8 indicates that eliminating the current Social Security system increases average 
labor supply by 2.65 years over the life-cycle. Such observation is also mentioned quali-
tatively in Gustman and Steinmeier (1986) and Rust and Phelan (1997). Figure 6b shows 
that the increases in the labor supply and log wages are most phenomenal at old ages in 
the experiment without Social Security system. 
Another point worth emphasizing is that in almost every policy counterfactual, the 
increase in the endogenously determined wage levels are substantial. This is especially 
true at old ages: 6% when removing the earnings test or reducing Social Security beneft, 
3% when delaying NRA by two years, and over 10% when removing Social Security ben-
eft or the entire system.28 These are caused by increases in the human capital levels as 
a result of higher investment. For this reason, it is likely that ignoring the human capital 
investment channel would generate bias in terms of predicting LFPR at old ages in similar 
experiments. 
27The income taxes are still effective. 
28The only exception is the experiment of removing Social Security taxes. 
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7 Conclusion 
This paper develops and estimates a rich life-cycle model that merges a Ben-Porath 
style human capital framework with a neoclassical style framework with endogenous 
labor supply and retirement framework. In the model, each individual makes decisions 
on consumption, human capital investment, labor supply and retirement. Investment in 
human capital generates wage growth over the life-cycle, while depreciation of human 
capital is the main force generating retirement. We show that the parsimonious model 
is able to ft the main features of life-cycle labor supply, wages (with and without fxed 
effects) as well as retirement. In particular we can ft both the large increase in wages 
and small changes in labor supply at the beginning of the life-cycle along with the small 
changes in wages but large changes in labor supply at the end. We incorporate health 
into the model and show that while this is an important factor, human capital remains 
the main explanation for the decline in labor supply for older workers. 
We use the estimated model to simulate the impacts of various policy changes. While 
prior work typically takes the wage process as given and focuses on the retirement de-
cision, we are able to model the effect of the policy change on the wage process and the 
labor supply decisions. As we show in our model, less generous Social Security benefts 
result in higher labor supply later in the life-cycle, so workers adjust their investment over 
the life-cycle. This results in a higher human capital level as well as higher labor supply 
earlier in the life-cycle. Compared with the baseline model, the labor supply response to 
policy changes are much smaller in most experiments when human capital is completely 
exogenous, but slightly larger in most experiments in the learning-by-doing model. The 
bottom line is that modeling labor supply and human capital decisions jointly is critical 
in an analysis of the effects of policy changes. While presumably other factors would be 
important for explaining other features of labor markets, endogenous labor supply is crit-
ical for understanding life-cycle human capital investment and life-cycle human capital 
investment is critical for understanding life-cycle labor supply. 
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Figure 2: Log wage profles of male high school graduates with and without controlling 
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Figure 5a: Fit of model with health 
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Figure 5b: Sensitivity to heath preferences: health status fxed and taste for leisure un-
changed after age 50 
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Figure 6a: [Baseline model] Policy experiments: reduce Social Security benefts 
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Figure 6b: [Baseline model] Policy experiments: remove Social Security taxes or benefts 
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Table A1: Wage income tax codes (in 2004$). 
Marginal Tax Rate Pre-tax (Y) Post-tax Income 
0.0765 ≤ 10, 250 0.9235Y 
0.1765 10, 251 − 20, 450 9, 465.88 + 0.8235 (Y − 10, 250) 
0.2265 20, 451 − 49, 150 17, 865.58 + 0.7735 (Y − 20, 450) 
0.3265 49, 151 − 87, 900 40, 065.03 + 0.6735 (Y − 49, 150) 
0.2645 87, 901 − 110, 750 66, 163.15 + 0.7355 (Y − 87, 900) 
0.2945 110, 751 − 172, 950 82, 969.33 + 0.7055 (Y − 110, 750) 
0.3445 172, 951 − 329, 350 126, 851.43 + 0.6555 (Y − 172, 950) 
0.3645 ≥ 329, 351 229, 371.63 + 0.6355 (Y − 329, 350) 
Appendix 
A Taxes 
We use tax codes in the year of 2004. There are two different kinds of taxes that the 
worker’s wage income is subject to, namely the payroll taxes and the federal income 
taxes. We ignore the state income taxes. The payroll taxes include the Social Security 
portion, 6.2% capped at $87, 900, and the Medicare tax, 1.45% uncapped. The federal 
income taxes are progressive and we use the tax rules under head of household. The 
personal exemption for each person is $3, 100 and the standard deduction for head of 
household is $7, 150. These all together generate the tax codes used in the paper in Table 
A1. 
B Social Security 
We use most Social Security rules in the year of 2004.29 
B.1 The Social Security Benefts 
The normal retirement age (NRA) is 65. The worker receives full Social Security ben-
efts if he applies for the benefts at the NRA. The full retirement benefts are equal to 
the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA), which is a function of Average Indexed Monthly 
Earnings (AIME), 
PIA = 0.9 ∗ min {bp1, AIME} + 0.32 ∗ min {bp2 − bp1, max {0, AIME − bp1}} 
+0.15 ∗ max {0, AIME − bp2} , (B.1) 
29Most of information about Social Security benefts in this section is extracted from http://www.ssa.gov. 
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where (bp1, bp2) = (612, 3689) where the dollar amounts are for 2004. 
The AIME is computed as the monthly average earning of the 35 years with highest 
infation-adjusted earnings. Only earnings subject to the Social Security tax are used in 
the calculation and therefore AIME is capped. The included earning in a specifc year is 
adjusted for wage infation by multiplying the wage growth rate relative to the base year, 
which is at age 60. The wage growth rate is calculated by dividing the average wage in 
the base year by the average wage in that specifc year. Earnings after the base year are 
not adjusted. Interestingly, the wage growth rate of the national average wage index is 
very similar to the growth rate of CPI-U after Year 1969, as shown in Figure B1, so we 
ignore the small difference between these two and use the real wages to update AIME 
without adjustment. 
Computing exact AIME requires keeping tracking of the worker’s earning history, 
which is computationally infeasible. Instead we apply an approximating method, taking 
into account the wage growth pattern over the life-cycle,   
AIMEt+1 = AIMEt + max 0, 
sset − sharemin (t) · AIMEt (B.2)35 × 12 
¯ ¯
The sharemin is the share of minimum wage in AIME. Figure B2 lists the estimated sharemin (t) 
from CPS data for age 52 to 76, assuming the starting working age of 16, and sharemin (t < 52)=0. 
The early retirement age (ERA) is 62. Starting from ERA, the worker is eligible to 
receiving the Social Security benefts at a reduced level. In this case, the beneft is reduced 
5/9 of one percent for each month before NRA, or 6.67% per year, up to three years. 
Beyond three years, the beneft is reduced 5/12 of one percent per month or 5% per year. 
On the other hand, delayed receiving Social Security benefts after the NRA increases 
benefts. The delayed retirement credit (DRC) of 6% is given to the applicant for each 
delayed year up to age 69.30 No DRC is given for applicants at age 70 or older. 
where sset = min {Ht (1− ̀  t) (1− It) , sse} is included earning, capped at sse = $87, 900. 
B.2 The Social Security Earnings Test 
We use the Social Security earnings test rules in 1999.31 The Social Security benefts 
could be withheld partly or totally if the worker is earning income while taking the Social 
Security benefts at ages before 70. 
30The 6% DRC is for cohorts born between 1935 and 1936 (inclusive). The DRC varies from 3% for cohorts 
born in 1924 or earlier to 8% for cohorts born in 1943 or later. In between, it increases by 0.5% every two 
years. 
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For benefciary under age 65, $1 of benefts for every $2 of earnings in excess of the 
exempt amount under 1999 rules ($10, 885 in 2004 dollars) is withheld. The beneft with-
holding rate for those aged 65-69 is $1 of benefts for every $3 of earnings in excess of the 
exempt amount ($17, 575 in 2004 dollars). 
If a whole year’s worth of benefts is withheld between ages 62 to 64, benefts in the 
future will be raised by 6.7% each year. If the beneft is withheld between age 65 to 69, 
the future benefts will be raised by 6.0%. Given our terminal age at 80, it is favorable for 
individuals aged 62 to 64 but not actuarially fair for individuals aged 65 or older. 
B.3 Taxable Social Security Benefts 
The Social Security benefts are not taxable if it is the only income. If there is other 
income, compute “total income” as the sum of half of the benefts and all other income. 
If total income is no more than the base amount ($25, 000 for head of household) then no 
benefts are taxable. If total income is higher than $34, 000 then up to 85% of the benefts 
could be taxable32. Assume the Social Security benefts are yss and all the other income is 
yo, the taxable part of Social Security benefts is calculated as 
(B.3)







1940 1960 1980 2000 2020
Year
NAW index to 2004
CPI−U to 2004
32We use the “head of household" which is similar to “single". 
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